The Power of Nationalist Mythology by Zank, Wolfgang
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
The Power of Nationalist Mythology
Zank, Wolfgang
Publication date:
2004
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Zank, W. (2004). The Power of Nationalist Mythology. Aalborg Universitet. SPIRIT Discussion Papers No. 24
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 26, 2020
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 24/2004 
 
THE POWER OF NATIONALIST MYTHOLOGY: 
 
A CRITIQUE OF IMPORTANT AUTHORS ON NATIONALISM 
WHO BECAME CONQUERED BY THE IDEOLOGY  
THEY WROTE ABOUT 
(E. GELLNER, A. SMITH, AND PARTICULARLY L. GREENFELD) 
 
by 
 
Wolfgang Zank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPIRIT 
School for Postgraduate 
Interdisciplinary Research on 
Interculturalism and Transnationality 
 
 
Aalborg University 
 
 
 
Center for International Studies 
Aalborg University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE POWER OF NATIONALIST MYTHOLOGY 
A Critique of Important Authors on Nationalism  
Who Became Conquered by the Ideology They Wrote About 
(E. Gellner, A. Smith, and Particularly L. Greenfeld) 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wolfgang Zank 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 24/2004 
 
 
 
8 Wolfgang Zank 
 
ISSN 1397-9043 
 
 
Published by: 
SPIRIT 
Aalborg University 
Fibigerstraede 2 
Dk-9220 Aalborg OE, Denmark 
 
Phone + 45 96 35 84 38 
Fax     + 45 98 15 11 26 
http://www.humsamf.auc.dk/spirit 
 
 
SPIRIT – School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research   
  on Interculturalism and Transnationality  
 
 
Directors: Jean Monnet Professor Staffan Zetterholm & Associate Professor Henrik Halkier 
 
SPIRIT is an interdisciplinary doctoral school for the systematic study of themes and theoretical 
issues related to the intertwining of political, transnational and intercultural processes in the 
contemporary world. 
  
It is dedicated to examining – from the combined vantage point of both the human and the social 
sciences – cultural, political and communicative issues on a spectrum ranging from the local 
dimension over the national and the regional to the processes of globalisation that increasingly 
impinge on the organisation of life and the structure and dynamics of the world.   
 
The thematic issues range from questions of European nationalism or European identity and 
integration; over transnational processes of migration, subcultures and international marketing; to 
transatlantic problems or nationalism and religion in Eastern Europe or the USA. What tie them 
together within the framework of SPIRIT are the school's distinctive features: Analysing themes in 
the context of the meanings and implications of internationality, and taking cultural/communicative 
as well as political/sociological aspects into account. The thematic area includes a long historical 
perspective reaching from pre-modern to contemporary Europe.  
 
Considerable emphasis is placed on Europe - its history, politics, social anthropology, place in the 
world, relations to global issues, and trajectories for the future. On this background, research is 
conducted within the following four thematic areas:  
 
1. Studies of Identity, Mentality and Culture  
2. Global Markets and Organisations: Co-operation and Competition  
3. Regions, Cultures and Institutional Change  
4. International Politics, Ideas and International Change  
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
0. Prologue: Some Concepts and Methodological Problems...................................2 
 
1. Ernest Gellner: Industrial Society and the “Homogeneous” Nation....................9 
 
2. Anthony D. Smith: Nations as Ethnic Communities .........................................13 
 
3. Liah Greenfeld: Nationalist mythology in our time...........................................22 
 
4. Conclusion .........................................................................................................32 
 
References ............................................................................................................35 
 
 
The Power of Nationalist Mythology: 
A Critique of Important Authors on Nationalism Who Became Conquered by the 
Ideology They Wrote About (E. Gellner, A. Smith, and Particularly L. Greenfeld)•.  
 
Wolfgang Zank 
Institute for History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University 
 
 
 Nationalism has been one of the most important forces in history. 
Therefore it cannot come as a surprise that still today nationalist myths and 
stereotypes are familiar features of western societies. Given the point that 
they are at best untenable simplifications, if not completely at variance with 
reality, one might expect that they are not to be found in academia. But 
academic life is not isolated from general cultural currents, and there is a 
permanent risk that prejudices slip through the filters of academic scrutiny. 
 I contend that this has happened as regards nationalist mythologies.  
I further contend that in particular the relatively new academic branch of 
“research on nationalism” has acted as a vehicle for the transport of 
mythology and stereotypes into academia. Consequently, at a time when 
nationalist ideology has been slowly but steadily declining in society at 
large, some sections of academia have practised a kind of nationalist-
mythologist revival. It is claimed that substantial elements of nationalist 
mythology can be traced in important academic literature of rather recent 
date. This applies also to authors who cannot be characterised as political 
nationalists. Ernest Gellner is perhaps a case in point. However, various 
other works can be seen as emanations of nationalist ideology proper; 
wrapped up into fine academic parlance, they aim at transporting crude 
national stereotypes. This is explained in detail below. 
 This problematique is closely connected to questions of 
methodology. Academic work is first and foremost a question of methods. 
And the methods of social sciences are sufficiently developed to filter 
nationalist mythologies and stereotypes out of academic productions, at 
least to a high extent. Thus, if they can be found there, then important 
methodological standards have been set aside. 
 By analysing some pieces of authoritative literature, I want to give 
substance to these contentions. However, the purpose of this paper is not 
only of a critical character. By discussing the above-mentioned problems, I 
hope also to contribute with some clarifications as to the subject matter, i.e. 
nationalism and national identity.  
 The main section of this paper contains a critical review of three 
books written by Ernest Gellner (Cambridge University), Anthony Smith 
(London School of Economics), and Liah Greenfeld (when writing the book 
                                                 
• I thank Ulf Hedetoft, Iben Kierkegaard and Staffan Zetterholm, all from Aalborg University, for 
careful criticism of previous drafts of this paper. The responsibility for remaining errors remains, 
of course, exclusively my own. 
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reviewed here, Harvard University). However, in the prologue, we will first 
discuss some basic conceptual and methodological problems. 
 
0. Prologue: Some Concepts and Methodological 
Problems 
 
a) National Identity and Nationalist Mythology 
 
 Members of a nation share a group feeling of belonging to this 
nation. The intensity of this group feeling varies among the citizens, but as 
to the existence of this group feeling we are on safe empirical ground. This 
group feeling is expressed in various symbols (flags, national football 
teams, monarchies, etc.), and these symbols are – albeit to a very different 
degree - of an emotional value to the citizens. Furthermore, national borders 
are still today substantial barriers to communication. There is usually a 
much more intensive communication inside national borders than across 
them. This is, besides language problems, due to the point that political and 
legal systems are still predominantly national systems. To a high extent this 
is also the case for economic markets, also in EU countries.1 This implies 
that things which happen inside a country matter much more for the 
individual than events outside the country.   
 As a first approximation, we might also accept that today most 
nation states have a common standard language. This aspect should, 
however, not be driven too far. There are countries such as Switzerland 
where we find three national languages. And one language, English in 
particular, can serve as standard language for many countries; the 
differences between e.g. British and Australian English are hardly a barrier 
for communication, at least not more than the differences between English 
sociolects. With these reservations in mind we can say that in most cases 
the national group feeling is supported and facilitated by a common 
standard speech. The qualifier “today” is important, because this linguistic 
unity is of a recent date. Even a small country such as Denmark was by 
about 1900 divided into numerous idioms (i.e. “dialects”), which were 
mutually incomprehensible. Standard Danish was restricted to a relatively 
small layer of well-educated people, thus the majority of the population was 
not a part of any larger linguistic community. In Italy at the time of 
unification (1861), only about 2.5 per cent of the population mastered 
“Italian”.2 It was the progress of school education and later the coming of 
mass media such as radio and subsequently TV which (rather recently) 
brought about national linguistic unification. 
                                                 
1 Madsen, Poul Thøjs, Grænser for Det Indre Marked, Aarhus 2001, esp. p. 49. 
2 Hobsbawm, Eric J., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge 
University Press, Canto Edition, 2. edition, 1992, p. 38. 
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  The national group feeling, the symbols which express it, and the 
pieces of information and images which, due to more internal than external 
communication, are relatively specific to a nation can conveniently be 
summarised under the term National Identity.3 
 Often, however, National Identity is perceived as containing also 
patterns of behaviour, values, norms or systems of cognitive or moral 
beliefs, which allegedly should be common for a nation. We will see 
examples below. It is exactly here where nationalist mythology begins.  
 People can feel like belonging to one nation, and at the same time 
behave very differently and have different values or systems of cognitive 
beliefs. The majority of the people in most European countries are 
Christians, but there are many variations inside this belief. Substantial 
fractions of those who formally are Christians adhere to systems of causal 
beliefs, which are incompatible with Christian theology (e.g. astrology). 
Furthermore, substantial minorities let themselves inspire by Buddhism 
while others are atheists. Consequently, what Max Weber called the “last 
realities” are interpreted very differently by different members of national 
communities. In addition, people can belong to one nation and at the same 
time have completely different attitudes to foreigners or divergent sexual 
orientations, to principles of education, or as regards materialist versus post-
materialist values. Furthermore, many if not most cultural features in 
Europe have been cross-national: Christianity, patterns of nationalist 
mythology, anti-Semitism, post-materialism.  
 Consequently, all European countries have been cultural “cocktails”. 
The nations have been particular only in the sense that the exact 
specification and specific weights of the ingredients have been different 
from country to country. All countries have been cultural Melting Pots.4 
 In all European countries various socio-cultural milieux have existed, 
with strongly divergent cultural values. Many have been rather stable over 
time, and they have shaped the political landscape for decades. In e.g. 
Germany after 1871, four major milieux with rather stable party affiliations 
could be discerned:5 
• a liberal Protestant urban bourgeois milieu, 
• a rural Protestant agrarian conservative milieu,  
• a Catholic milieu, and 
• an urban socialist working-class milieu.  
 
 Also France has exhibited a huge amount of divergent and often 
conflicting cultural patterns which have been remarkably stable over time. 
                                                 
3 I agree therefore in principle with the Danish sociologist Peter Gundelach, who, however, defines 
National Identity only as a group feeling. Our term, including e.g. the symbols, which express the 
group feeling, is slightly broader. Gundelach, Peter, Det er dansk, København 2002, pp. 66 and 69-
75. 
4 As to Germany, I have developed this perspective more extensively: Wolfgang Zank, The 
German Melting Pot. Multiculturality in Historical Perspective, Houndmills/Basingstoke and New 
York, 1998. 
5 Ibid., passim. 
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Or as Emanuel Todd put it: “We can present France as a heterogeneous and 
open space …”6 Hence, my claim that nations have been culturally 
heterogeneous, is hardly original. In fact, I would rather see this as a 
banality. But, as we shall see later, sometimes it is necessary to underline 
banalities.  
 As opposed to symbols, there have never been patterns of behaviour 
or moral or cognitive beliefs which were common for a whole nation. To 
suppose the existence of such a “national identity” is thus the step where 
national mythology and national stereotyping begins. This supposition is a 
heritage from nationalist mythology. The mistake is, in a way, an 
understandable one. As to the group feeling and the corresponding symbols, 
nations have in fact been united. In this sense commonness actually has 
existed. The error has been to extrapolate this common group feeling to an 
(imaginary) union of values, norms and beliefs. 
  
 Historically, nationalist mythologies have exhibited a great variation. 
But some features have been in common. The first point has exactly been 
the contention that nations show cultural homogeneity. Allegedly, the 
members of one nation share cultural characteristics such as norms, values, 
mentalities or patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs; this bundle of 
characteristics should have constituted a particular “-ness”: Danishness, 
Germanness, Frenchness, or the like.7 
 Often nationalists have conceded that not all members of a nation 
exhibited the proper “-ness”. Those were then allegedly a kind of “traitors” 
who placed themselves outside the national community. These “internal 
enemies” could actually constitute the majority of the population.8 Yet, 
even when nationalists labelled the majority of their countrymen as “bad”, 
they were able to retain the belief in the existence of a good “-ness” which 
was “typical” for the nation.   
 In nationalist mythology, the “-ness” of a nation has been something 
unique, and therefore, all nations have been “very special”.  The myth of the 
“-ness” has been used as an auto-stereotype and as a hetero-stereotype. As 
many scholars (e.g. Max Weber) have pointed out, hetero-stereotypes and 
auto-stereotypes have been mutually supporting each other: By depicting 
the “-ness” of others as “different”, if not inferior or outright evil, the belief 
                                                 
6 “On peut représenter la France comme un espace ouvert et hétérogène …” Todd, Emmanuel, La 
Nouvelle France, Paris, 1988, p. 19. I found this book, which contains an enormous amount of 
fascinating empirical material, to be extremely stimulating. But when Todd depicts the 
anthropological systèmes familiaux (dissolved for almost two centuries) as being at the basis of the 
political cleavages and the party system of modern France until quite recently, I cannot follow.  
7 For an example, in casu “Germanness”, see the speech in 1915 by law professor Otto v. Gierke 
where e.g. “faithfulness”, “strong sense of duty”, “honesty and justice” where presented as typical 
German values, as quoted in Erwin K. Scheuch, Wie deutsch sind die Deutschen? Eine Nation 
wandelt ihr Gesicht, Bergisch-Gladbach, 1991, p. 89. 
8 In e.g. Germany before 1914 many nationalists regarded Social Democrats, political Catholicism 
(Zentrum Party), and linguistic minorities such as Poles or Danes as internal enemies. In the 
Reichstag elections of 1912, these groups gained more than half of the votes. Zank, op. cit., pp. 97-
135. 
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in the particularity of one’s own “-ness”, and thereby the national group 
feeling, has become strengthened. 
 The idea of a particular “-ness” of a nation has been a myth, but this 
does not mean that this idea has been unimportant. On the contrary,  
liberating the “-ness” from external oppression or defending it against 
foreign intrusions has constituted powerful motives for human action. And, 
ironically, the idea of a homogeneous “-ness” actually contributed to 
bringing about a certain homogeneity. Language has been a case in point: 
Many countries have experienced waves of linguistic purification where 
activist groups or even the state bureaucracy have endeavoured to expel 
“foreign” or “impure” words from the “mother tongue”. In addition, the 
policy of forceful linguistic homogenisation, which several countries 
practised, particularly during the decades before 1914, was, among many 
other factors, fuelled by the belief of the existence of the national “-ness”. 
This was, however, a case of an interesting intellectual “drift”: The original 
nationalist claim was that there existed a common national “-ness”; when 
confronted with the fact that this was not the case, nationalists concluded 
that the “commonness” had to be created actively, if necessary by forceful 
means.  
  The second pillar of nationalist mythology has been the contention 
that the “-ness” has been constant over time, “very old”, almost eternal, and, 
by implication, with a long life ahead. “Eternal” characteristics were 
attributed both to other groups and to one’s own. 9  But in fact, one of the 
most essential features of modern times has been cultural change. 
Examples can be found in secularisation, rationalisation, the rise of literacy 
and higher education, or more recently, the change from materialist to post-
materialist values. Actually, the waxing and waning of nationalism and the 
changing character of nationalism itself 10 (cf. below in section 3 about 
Greenfeld) has been one of the most important aspects of cultural change. 
We have to go back to ancient Egypt if we want to look at a society in 
which culture was rather static for centuries.  
 However, again nationalist mythology has one real point: As to the 
group feeling and as to the symbols we can actually observe some 
constancy. Some national flags (e.g. the Danish Dannebrog) are several 
                                                 
9 Gierke (see above, note 7) traced the “Germanness” back to “Germanic times”. A particularly 
bizarre example of this way of thinking was perhaps produced by Dietrich Eckart, a close 
collaborator of the early Hitler. In his view, the Jews have been alike throughout the millennia, and 
all the time intent on bringing mischief to others by revolution. Moses was the first leader of 
Bolshevism. According to Eckart’s last brochure Bolshevism from Moses to Lenin. Dialogues 
between Adolf Hitler and me, published posthumously 1924, the two discussants held the view that 
the exodus of the Jews out of Egypt was a consequence of a murderous revolutionary assault by 
the Jews against Egypt’s leading elite. “Just as in our case” (i.e. Germany after the First World 
War) the Jews had tried to gain the support of the lower strata of society by using humanitarian 
phrases and paroles such as “Proletarians of all lands, unite!” At the very last moment the 
“national parts” of Egypt could prevent a bloody revolution and expel Jews and proletarians 
(Pöbelvolk). Der Bolschewismus von Moses bis Lenin. Zwiegespräche zwischen Adolf Hitler und 
mir, as quoted in Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche. Action Française – Italienischer 
Faschismus – Nationalsozialismus, 8th edition, München, 1990, p. 404. 
10 A brilliant overview is to be found e.g. in Hobsbawm, op. cit., passim. 
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centuries old, and educated Englishmen, Danes or Germans can read texts, 
which were written in the respective standard idioms some 300 years ago. 
Again the mistake is one of exaggeration, namely to conclude from the 
relative constancy of some symbols to the constancy of patterns of 
cognitive or moral beliefs.    
 Another pattern which is often found in nationalist mythology is the 
use of biological analogies. Already in the eyes of Johann Gottfried Herder, 
perhaps the most important of the “founding fathers” of nationalist 
mythology, nations were like plants or persons, with a soul and a definite 
life span. And as everything in nature they were God’s creation.11 Plants 
and persons seem to be something very concrete and tangible. But in many 
respects, biological analogies have been very misleading. A higher 
biological organism such as a human being keeps many essential features 
throughout its lifetime. Of course, a male at the age of ten is different from 
the same person at the age of seventy. But most physiological processes, or 
the organs and their function, remain essentially the same. By contrast, the 
economic processes of a society (the only thing which could be likened to 
metabolism) are completely different after 150 years, and so is the pattern 
of institutions. The basic characteristic of modern society is exactly change, 
whereas a biological organism to a large extent remains the same. The 
biological analogy thus metaphorically expresses the second main tenet of 
nationalist mythology, the constancy over time. Furthermore, the organs of 
a body work together, and most of them are mutually indispensable. By 
contrast, groups in a society often have different interests. In this sense, a 
biological analogy gives an over-harmonic picture of a society. It also 
furthers the ideological implication that every member should see 
him/herself as part of a whole, and accept her/his place in it. And, finally, 
nations can be cut over and flourish nevertheless (e.g. West Germany, 
South Korea), whereas higher organisms such as human beings die 
immediately, if cut over. 
 It might, of course, be legitimate for a contemporary scholar to work 
with the hypothesis that a society resembles a biological organism and then 
test it. But it is a relict of nationalist mythology if the validity of biological 
analogies, without further argumentation, is simply claimed.     
 We speak of myths when central tenets of nationalism such as the 
homogeneity of the “-ness” or its “eternal character” become uncritically 
reproduced. In this sense, serious academic work and nationalist mythology 
do not rhyme. To quote Eric J. Hobsbawm: “Finally, I cannot but add that 
no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political 
nationalist … Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not 
so. As Renan said: ‘Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.’”12 
 
b) The “methodology” of national stereotyping 
                                                 
11 Iggers, Georg, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Kritik der traditionellen 
Geschichtsauffassung von Herder bis zur Gegenwart, München, 1971, p. 51. 
12 Hobsbawm, op. cit, p. 12. 
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 I claimed above that nationalist myths and stereotypes are also to be 
found in newer academic literature. Before we have a look at concrete 
examples, we will discuss a piece of methodology. Below is given a semi-
fictive13 example, in which the content presumably will be viewed as 
absurd, but the general methods in which are to be found in real academic 
literature (see below). 
 The first step is a qualitative observation (which might be perfectly 
accurate): 
  
1st step: Observation: “On March 27 we could observe three Danes at the railway 
station in Copenhagen who were severely  drunk.” 
 
 The second step is generalisation. It involves the use of the definite 
article (e.g. “the” Danes) or of terms such as “national culture” or “national 
identity”. 
 
2nd step: Generalisation: “It is part of the Danish national culture to be constantly 
intoxicated by alcoholic beverages.” 
  
 Many people might have doubts about such a generalisation, given 
the point that there are Danes who are not permanently drunk. So we need a 
softening clause: 
 
3rd step: softening clause: Of course, this is not valid for all Danes, there have always 
been some exceptions.” 
  
 This clause, however, is not allowed to have any influence on the 
further reasoning. The last step is therefore the unimpressed resumption of 
the generalisation: 
 
4th step: Unimpressed resumption: “But it is nevertheless possible to identify the 
dominant characteristics of the Danish National Culture, namely …” 
 
 Finally, this position is buttressed by the collection of evidence 
which fits into the pattern. The essential point is to collect only qualitative 
material which is filtered through a process of high selectivity. In the 
concrete case, articles in the Danish press, which contain stories of 
alcoholism, or novels such as Tom Kristensen’s Hærværk (where the main 
figures actually are under the influence of alcohol most of the time), or  
reports about alcoholism-related diseases will serve this purpose.  It is, 
however, essential that all contrary empirical evidence becomes discarded 
or neutralised by step 3 (“Of course, there are some exceptions, but …”). 
And finally, we have to avoid any quantitative reasoning or discuss 
representativity. We simply implicitly suppose that our examples are 
representative. 
                                                 
13 I once had to discuss against such a position. 
 
 
 
8 
 Before we have a look at concrete examples, it might be helpful 
shortly to recapitulate the basic characteristics of the methods which can 
produce representative results. 
  
c) Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
 
    Representative results can be obtained in two ways.14 One consists 
of questioning a sample of people who, in regards to certain characteristics 
such as age, sex or income distribution, reflect the whole population. 
Another method, more frequently used nowadays, is to construct a sample 
where each individual of a nation has the same statistical chance to enter 
this sample. Every sample must consist of a huge number of people. In 
countries such as Germany, the sample size is often 3000, whereas in 
Denmark in polls only about 800 people are questioned. The required size 
of a sample means that it is practically impossible for one person to 
establish representative results. When working historically, there is the 
additional problem that successful representative methods were introduced 
as late as 1936 (by George Gallup). Before this date, we are usually in the 
mist.  
 Quantitative methods have several drawbacks. Perhaps most 
importantly, they cannot reveal anything properly new. Questions and 
answers have to be standardised, and everything, which does not fit into this 
straight jacket, will pass unnoticed. Said differently, you can  only counts 
items when you know about these items beforehand.  
 In this perspective, qualitative methods are superior. By conducting 
open interviews, reading letters or examining novels, the scholar can learn 
something really new, about values, outlooks, perspectives and other 
cultural features which were unknown to him before. But qualitative 
methods have a drawback too: They cannot be generalised. For instance, 
reading Hærværk tells us something about this novel, and the conjecture 
that it, at least partially, reflects Tom Kristensen’s experiences is plausible. 
But this tells us nothing about the question of how widespread these 
phenomena were. Qualitative and quantitative methods are simply two 
different sets of tools, suitable for different types of problems. Or as an 
author of an introductory text has formulated it so graphically.15 
 
If we want to find out whether a phenomenon exists, and if it exists, how it looks like, 
then we choose a qualitative method. However, if we want to know how widespread a 
phenomenon is … we choose a quantitative method. 
 
 And in case we want to find out both, we have to combine the two 
methods. We start with qualitative methods, in order to assess the 
qualitative features of a phenomenon. And thereafter we translate the 
                                                 
14 See, for instance, Allerbeck, Klaus, ‘Repräsentativität’, Endruweit, Günther and Trommsdorff, 
Gisela (eds.), Wörterbuch der Soziologie, Band 2, Stuttgart, 1989, pp. 543-545.   
15 Salomonsen, Per, Grundlæggende metodebegreber i sociologi, København, 3rd ed., 1995, p. 19. 
My translation, W.Z. 
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observed qualitative features into standardised questions that allow for 
quantitative research. Very often, however, this second step is omitted.  
Authors simply assume that qualitative observations are representative. This 
is a methodological sin which allows national stereotypes to filter into 
academic productions.  
 We now turn now to the main section, the review of a number of 
works on nationalism. 
  
1. Ernest Gellner: Industrial Society and the 
“Homogeneous” Nation  
 
 It might surprise the reader that I claim that Ernest Gellner’s famous 
book Nations and Nationalism,16 printed in many paperback editions, 
reproduces elements of national mythology. Gellner, a professor of social 
anthropology at Cambridge, was certainly no political nationalist, and in 
many respects his book can be read as an essay at deconstructing national 
mythologies.17 But the de-construction applies mainly to the nationalist 
myth that nations are age-old. As to the other pillar of nationalist 
mythology, the supposed homogeneity of the nation, Gellner does not 
deconstruct.  
 According to Gellner, modern nations and nationalisms are basically 
the result of the transition to industrial society. The preceding agrarian 
societies were characterised by “laterally insulated communities of 
agricultural producers”, above which there were various “stratified, 
horizontally segregated layers of military, administrative, clerical and 
sometimes commercial ruling classes.”18 Among the ruling strata, there is 
“great stress on cultural differentiation … The more differentiated in style 
of all kinds the various strata are, the less friction and ambiguity there will 
be between them. The whole system favours horizontal lines of cultural 
cleavages.”19 Below these top strata the majority of the population lives in 
 
laterally separated petty communities … Here, once again, cultural differentiation is 
very marked, though the reasons are quite different. Small peasant communities 
generally live inward-turned lives … a kind of cultural drift soon engenders dialectical 
and other differences. No-one, or almost no-one, has an interest in promoting cultural 
homogeneity at this social level.20 
 
                                                 
16 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, 1993 (first edition 1983).  
17 He writes explicitly: “… nationalist ideology suffers from pervasive false consciousness. Its 
myths inverts reality: it claims to defend folk culture while in fact it is forging a high culture; it 
claims to protect an old folk society while in fact helping to build up an anonymous mass society.” 
Ibid., p. 124. 
18 Ibid., p.9, figure 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 10.  
20 Ibid. 
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 The transition to industrial society alters this picture dramatically: It 
imposes cultural homogeneity. Gellner’s argument hinges on the “general 
and central features of industrial society”: 
 
Universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication are 
among its functional prerequisites. Its members must be mobile, and ready to shift from 
one activity to another, and must possess that generic training which enables them to 
follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation. In the course of 
their work they must constantly communicate with a large number of men, with whom 
they frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication must 
consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context. They must be able to 
communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it may-concern 
type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and 
standardized linguistic medium and script. The educational system which guarantees 
this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable …21 
 
 These functional prerequisites have, in Gellner’s view, enormous 
cultural implications: 
 
Culture is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimisation of a social 
order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the 
necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared 
atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and 
produce. For a given society, it must be one in which they can all breath and speak and 
produce; so it must be the same culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high 
(literate, training-sustained) culture … 22 
 
 This is, according to Gellner, the clue to understand nationalism. It 
was not so that nationalism imposed homogeneity on society; “it is rather 
that homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually 
appears on the surface in the form of nationalism,”23 “it is the objective 
need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism”24. These 
constellations created the modern nation states:  
  
… when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally-
sustained high-cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a 
situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures 
constitutes very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently 
identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. 
Only then does it come to appear that any defiance of their boundaries by political units 
constitutes a scandal. 
 … In these conditions, men will to be politically united with all those, and only those, 
who share their culture. Polities then will to extend their boundaries to the limits of their 
cultures, and to protect and impose their culture with [within?] their boundaries of their 
power.25 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 35. 
22 Ibid., p. 37f. 
23 Ibid., p. 39. 
24 Ibid., p. 46. 
25 Ibid., p. 55 
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 This last passage corresponds with his basic definition of his subject: 
“Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent.”26 
 Gellner’s book received much acclaim. “Brilliant, provocative, (…), 
a great book” (New Statesman), “A better explanation than anyone else has 
yet offered why nationalism is such a prominent principle of political 
legitimacy today (…) a terse and forceful work” (Times Literary 
Supplement).27 
 Gellner’s book is indeed stimulating, and it contains a rich variety of 
valuable insights. But essential building blocks of his argumentation are 
unfortunately at odds with many facts. To begin with, he explains the rise of 
nationalism by the functional prerequisites of industrial society. So, it 
should have been industrialisation which created nationalism. But 
nationalism is older than industrialisation, even in England, the country 
which pioneered industrialisation. And Herder wrote his works before the 
first steam engines came to Germany. Also the French revolution, often 
portrayed as the event which created nationalism as a mass phenomenon, 
took place in a predominantly agrarian country, with some sections of 
handicraft, artisanship and services, but practically no industry. And when 
the industrialisation eventually took place, it often did not result in high 
culture and qualification, but rather in de-qualification: Old and highly 
sophisticated handicraft traditions and skills became obsolete and were 
replaced by unskilled women and children who performed often rather 
monotonous work at attending machines. Industrialisation has been a highly 
complex process which Gellner’s rather crude model only insufficiently 
reflects.  
 In our context, however, more important: Gellner’s postulate that 
industry requires cultural homogeneity, is strikingly unrealistic. Industrial 
conglomerations have in numerous cases been characterised by huge 
cultural diversity. To give one example, in 1976 about 29 percent of the 
workers at the BMW plant in Munich were foreign immigrants, mainly 
from Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and not the least Turkey.28 Also the Ruhr 
district has been a cultural meeting and merging place. Before 1914, there 
were between 300,000 and 350,000 Poles living in the Ruhr (mainly 
migrants from Prussia’s eastern provinces); if we add the Mazurians (a 
Protestant population in East Prussia, speaking a Polish idiom), the figure 
was about half a million.29 Numerous other workers were foreigners. The 
German-speaking workers were, of course, also highly divided when it 
comes to values or systems of beliefs. So in the Ruhr we found Polish 
associations, German nationalist organisations, Protestant communities, a 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 1. 
27 As reproduced on the backside of Gellner’s book. 
28 Wetzel, Juliane, ‘Integration im Grossbetrieb – das Beispiel BMW’, Benz, Wolfgang (Hrsg.), 
Integration ist machbar: Ausländer in Deutschland, München, 1993, pp. 93-108, esp. p. 94. 
29 Klessmann, Christoph, Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1945. Soziale Integration 
und nationale Subkultur einer Minderheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft, Göttingen, 1978, 
p. 22. 
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network of Catholic organisations of various kinds (integrating Germans 
and Poles), a widely ramified socialist milieu of Social Democrat 
organisations and trade unions (also integrating both Germans and others), 
and many more. There were many conflicts between these milieux and 
organisations. But nevertheless, the mines and steelworks of the Ruhr 
belonged to the most productive plants in the world. A similar picture we 
find at that time e.g. in British factories, with their many Irish or Welsh 
immigrants, or the industrial centres of Belgium and northern France, not to 
mention the American industrial centres, with their complex picture of 
numerous immigrant groups. 
 Today, the industrial conglomerate Airbus is based on a network of 
1500 manufacturers in 30 countries on 4 continents.30 How can such an 
industrial organisation, which cuts through an enormous row of national 
and cultural borders, develop successfully? Because industry is about 
constantly finding and developing new patterns of human cooperation 
across national borders. Contrary to Gellner’s view, the dynamics of 
industrialism, and more generally, capitalism, have had an in-built cross-
national logic. Already before 1914, the industrially developed countries 
were enmeshed in a dense network of international economic cooperation. 
This network was destroyed during the First World War, and not rebuilt in 
the inter-war period. In the 1930s many governments followed a nationalist 
economic policy and promoted e.g. industrial autarchy, but they did so 
against the logic of industrial development. The last decades, however, saw 
a renewal of the trend towards an ever-closer economic cooperation across 
national boundaries.  
Gellner has, of course, a point when he writes that industrial society 
depends much more than the previous rural society on explicit, context-free 
communication in a standard language. But Gellner goes an essential step 
too far when he writes that the culture must be the same. He seems to 
equate “ability to communicate” with “cultural homogeneity”, which is 
blatantly not the case. In a Ruhr steel plant, German socialist workers had to 
be able to communicate with deeply religious Catholic Poles, with a liberal 
engineer or a Protestant nationalist office clerk or director.   
 Gellner seems to be of the opinion that “same language” means 
“same culture”, and conversely, “different language” equates “different 
culture”. In his view, language (i.e. a system of symbols) seems to be 
strictly connected with other cultural phenomena, such as systems of 
cognitive and moral beliefs. Together they seem to form a coherent 
structure. We call this idea the “structuralist fallacy”. It is evidently wrong. 
People can speak a similar language and have e.g. very different moral 
values. And conversely, moral or cognitive beliefs (such as Catholicism) 
can be shared by people who speak completely different languages. 
 Gellner used also the alleged homogeneity of the nation state to to 
define political nationalism, namely as “a principle which holds that the 
                                                 
30 Airbus Industry, http://www.airbus.com/about/procurement.asp. 
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political and the national unit should be congruent.” This definition fits well 
for many nationalist movements, e.g. those in Italy and Germany in the first 
half of the 19th century. But the definition fails for many others. According 
to this definition, neither Italian Fascism nor German Nazism could be 
classified as nationalism. When e.g. the Italian fascist regime conquered 
Ethiopia in 1935, it “united” areas, which were culturally completely 
different from the Italian “political unit”. And why did Nazi Germany in 
March 1939 de facto annex the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, Gellner’s 
home country? Or how could the industrialised Japan in 1931 conquer 
Manchuria, China’s most industrialised region? It was Japan’s defeat in 
1945 that broke this “unity”, not the cultural differences between Japan and 
Manchuria. In none of these cases did the conqueror do much in order to 
impose cultural homogeneity on the conquered province. 
 Gellner’s definition and theory of nationalism cannot explain 
expansionist nationalism. On the contrary, according to his theory, 
expansionism would be against the very essence of nationalism. Many 
nationalists, the Nazis in the 1930s included, have claimed that this has 
been the case – in stark contrast to their own practice. We conclude that 
Gellner has accepted the mythology, which nationalist movements have 
created about themselves, at face value.   
 The following observation is presumably no coincidence: Through 
most of his book, Gellner argues calmly and rationally for his case. But 
exactly when it comes to the alleged necessity of cultural homogeneity in 
industrial society – the longer quote above is his only argument as to this 
point - his style turns vague: Culture turns into “life-blood”, or into the 
“atmosphere” within which alone the members of the society can “breathe”, 
and for “a given society, it must be one in which they can all breathe and 
speak and produce; so it must be the same culture.”31 In short, instead of 
arguments he uses biological analogies – in the “best” tradition of national 
mythology. Indeed, everyone has to breathe in order to survive. But there is 
no logical connection between breathing and the alleged homogeneity of 
culture. Instead of making it a matter of critical research, he placed the 
myth of national homogeneity uncritically at the very centre of his book. He 
then tried, by using abstract model reasoning, with hardly any reference to 
empirical material, to construct a theory on how this fictive national cultural 
homogeneity could have come about. But it never came about. 
 
2. Anthony D. Smith: Nations as Ethnic Communities 
 
 Anthony D. Smith, whose book National Identity32 has been printed 
in many editions as a Penguin paperback, has often been seen as a kind of 
opponent to Gellner. Whereas Gellner has been classified as a “modernist”, 
i.e. someone who sees the nation as an essentially modern construction, 
                                                 
31 See above, footnote 22. 
32 Smith, Anthony D., National Identity, London and New York, Penguin, 1991. 
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Smith has been labelled “traditionalist” because of his view that European 
nations have century-old roots and were formed around “ethnic cores”. As 
we shall see, this difference between them should not be exaggerated. Also 
Smith’s book can, at least partly, be seen as an essay at de-constructing 
nationalist ideology. But in contrast to Gellner, who proceeded mainly by 
abstract model reasoning, Smith unfolds a rich historical tableau of antique 
ethnical communities and the genesis of modern nations across the globe. 
His impressing knowledge makes this book interesting reading indeed. But 
his theoretical reasoning is not seldom self-contradictory or at variance with 
important facts. And also Smith cultivates the mythology of the 
homogeneous nation to quite some extent. 
  
 According to Smith, the “fundamental features of national identity” 
can be listed as follows:33 
1. an historic territory, or homeland 
2. common myths and historical memories 
3. a common, mass public culture 
4. common legal rights and duties for all members 
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members 
 
A nation can therefore be defined as a named human population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. 
 
 This list presumes a high degree of cultural homogeneity. Given the 
point that it defines the main subject of his book, a reader might expect 
substantial evidence supporting each point. But instead, Smith refers only to 
nationalist ideology: “These are assumptions and demands, common to all 
nationalists, and widely accepted even by their critics …” His argument for 
the central theoretical presumption of his book consists in the point that 
because nationalists of all sorts have believed that nations looked like that, 
it must be so in reality. In other words, he made nationalist ideology the 
basis of this theory. And Smith errs if he contends that these assumptions 
and demands are “widely accepted even by the critics” of nationalism. For 
instance, I would accept only point 1 (territory), and partly point 4 
(common legal rights). This criterion entails, however, that we can speak of 
nations only at a historically rather late point in time. Equality in front of 
the law was introduced as a principle roughly at about 1800, and in certain 
fields (voting rights for women) it had to wait until 1915 (Denmark), 1919 
(Germany) or 1946 (Italy). 
 Smith’s second point (“common myths and historical memories”) 
postulates a fond of cultural homogeneity. If these myths and memories 
were really common, it would be possible to empirically identify a kind of 
“Britishness”, “Frenchnesss”, or any other “-ness”. But Smith does not 
forward any empirical material. Instead he refers frequently to the 
constructions of nationalists. Again he seems to infer that nations have 
common myths and memories because nationalists have thought they did. 
                                                 
33 Smith, op. cit., p. 14, emphasis in the original. 
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 What should be the “common myths plus historical memories” of 
today’s Great Britain, Germany or Denmark? Because these countries are 
culturally heterogeneous, open societies, there exists a multitude of 
historical perspectives. History is a cultural battlefield where various actors 
construct competing views. There are, on the one hand, professional 
academics who build (or at least ought to build) their versions on scientific 
procedures. Among them there is consensus on a number of fields, mainly 
about “what happened”, but much disagreement when it comes to the 
question “why did it happen”. Furthermore, there is a huge body of 
historical literature which is produced by journalists, by amateurs, or by 
actors of various kinds who e.g. produce memoirs. Political parties and 
fringe groups (e.g. neo-Nazis) are at times quite productive too. Also the 
movie industry has become a powerful producer of historical versions, 
sometimes hopelessly (or deliberately) fictive. And among the population at 
large, personal memories and the oral tradition are as divergent and 
contradicting as the personal experiences have been.   
 There are, of course, some events that have been so momentous that 
practically every one knows about them. Practically all the British know 
that their country won the Second World War, and most Danes know that 
Denmark was occupied between 1940 and 1945. But at this point the 
“commonness” stops. There are many myths circulating in every country, 
but the myths are not common. 
 In Denmark, for instance, the mythology of a strong and efficient 
resistance movement has been quite widespread. The “classical” myth was 
perhaps the one about the effectiveness of railroad sabotage against German 
military transports in 1944.34 But as the historian Aage Trommer has 
documented convincingly, the sabotage actions were rather irrelevant from 
a military point of view.35 More in general, the political left has since 1945 
pointed at the fact that the official Denmark actively cooperated with the 
occupation power, a view which professional historians share. For instance, 
in 1941, the Danish police, on request by the Gestapo, arrested Communist 
activists and delivered more than was requested. In 1942, the Danish Prime 
Minister Wilhelm Buhl asked the general public to inform the police about 
saboteurs.  
 Against this background, it is a small wonder that after 1945, 
historical debates have regularly led to highly emotional controversies. Still 
                                                 
34 According to the popular Politikens Danmarks Historie, the railway sabotage against the 
movement of German troops from Norway to the Western front in 1944 was so effective that the 
German military had to face substantial delays. Guarding the lines bound 50,000-80,000 German 
troops. In the end, there were practically no transports any more, the German troops had to march 
on foot all the way down Jutland. Wendt, Franz, Besættelsen og Atomtid 1939-1965 (Politikens 
Danmarks Historie, Bind 14), København, 1966, pp. 297-301.  
35 From the time of the invasion in Normandy to the end of the war, the German army transferred 
30 divisions and combat units (brigade, regiment) through Jutland. Five divisions and one 
regimental combat unit were delayed more than a day (with 64 hours maximum), in the case of the 
other 25 divisions/units the delay was below one day. None of the delays had any influence on 
actual combats. Trommer, Aage, Jernbanesabotagen I Danmark under den anden verdenskrig, 
Odense University Press, 1971, esp. p. 172.  
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today, these subjects are polemically discussed in the Danish press 
practically every month. So, the myth about the widespread and effective 
resistance movement, or any other myths, have not been common for the 
Danes.  
 This is even more the case for Germany. The Fischer-Kontroverse in 
the 1960s and 1970s about Berlin’s role at the outbreak of the First World 
War,36 the Historiker-Streit in the 1980s about Ernst Nolte’s interpretation 
of Nazism as a mirror of and reaction against Bolshevism,37 the exhibition 
about war crimes committed by Wehrmacht units, the debate about Daniel 
J. Goldhagen’s book about “ordinary Germans and the Holocaust”38 – the 
number of fierce intellectual clashes about German history is almost 
endless. The GDR produced its own versions, and so have writers on the 
extreme right (effectively supported e.g. by the English historian David 
Irving). It is simply untenable to claim that modern nations have “common 
historical myths” in line with pre-modern ethnies. Smith does not present a 
single empirical example, and if he had searched he would not have found 
one.  
 Smith does, however, rather extensively show that nationalists, 
particularly in the 19th century, have been very busy in constructing 
historical myths, endeavouring to show that their respective countries have 
had a kind of “golden age” and a long majestic history.39 But Smith seems 
to jump directly from the nationalist mythology to the assumption that 
modern nations must have common myths. 
 He forwards, however, a functional argument: Historical myths give 
a feeling of “where we are coming from”, and hence whom we are. Thus, in 
this functional view, a myth might contribute to social cohesion. As to pre-
modern ethnies, this might have even been necessary. Yet, this has not been 
the case with modern nations. Modern nations owe their cohesion not to 
homogeneous beliefs, but to mechanisms such as equal rights, common 
laws and socialisation through a national educational system. Pre-modern 
ethnies and modern nations are something different, and by jumping from 
one to the other, Smith gives a distorted view of modern nations.    
 The third point on Smith’s list of “national identity” is a “common, 
mass public culture”. He does not explain this term. If he means the 
incorporation of the large majority of the population into a nation-wide 
education system, the development of nation-wide media and the ability of 
most persons to communicate by means of a standard speech, this criterion 
is certainly valid, albeit again only at a rather late date (roughly around 
1900 as regards Western, Northern and Central Europe). But he speaks of a 
                                                 
36 Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 
Königsstein, Ts, 1977 (first edition 1961). 
37 Nolte, Ernst, Der Europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917-1945, Nationalsozialismus and 
Bolschewismus, fourth edition, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1989. 
38 Goldhagen, Daniel J., Hitlers willige Vollstrecker. Ganz gewöhnliche Deutsche und der 
Holocaust, Berlin, 1996. 
39 Smith, op. cit., p. 161. 
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“common culture”. Does he mean common values, norms or cognitive 
beliefs? If he does so, Smith is again in the realm of nationalist mythology. 
 His last point refers to a “common economy”. Also this point 
remains practically unexplained. The only keyword he presents is the 
“territorial mobility of its members”. It was indeed part of the nation-
building process, mainly in the nineteenth century, that governments 
abolished internal barriers to mobility. But already before 1914, huge trans-
national migrations and international trade and cross-border investments 
had come about. This trend, which was interrupted in 1914 and in the inter-
war period, was resumed after the Second World War, with particular 
intensity within the EU. All modern economies are today enmeshed in a 
dense net of international division of labour. Also as to this point, Smith did 
not have a look at real economic processes, but at nationalist ideology: “By 
defining the membership, the boundaries and the resources, national 
identity provides the rationale for ideals of national autarchy.”40 Great 
Britain, his own country, abandoned any “ideals of national autarchy” in 
1846 (abolishment of the Corn Laws). Did she thereby cease to be a nation? 
Smith has got a point insofar as protectionists often used nationalist 
arguments to support their claims for e.g. higher tariffs. But the point that 
nationalist mythology has been supportive for protectionist policy does not 
mean that modern nations have a “common national economy”.  
 It is strange to observe that an author, who otherwise presents a long 
row of concrete and detailed facts, turns imprecise and patently counter-
factual, when he defines the central features of his main subject, nation and 
national identity. Necessarily so, because he could not liberate himself from 
the idea of the homogeneous nation, and this idea can only be “supported” 
by turning vague.  
 In Smith’s view, there are seemingly no essential differences 
between modern nations and pre-modern ethnical communities. In fact, 
Smith’s list of “National Identity” overlaps in important points with his 
attributes of an ethnic community or ethnie ( “1. a collective proper name 2. 
a myth of common ancestry 3. shared historical memories 4. one or more 
differentiating elements of common culture 5. an association with a specific 
‘homeland’ 6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the 
population”).41 As a comparison of his definitions show, nations are 
according to Smith only a particular kind of ethnie: Nations fulfil all the 
criteria of an ethnie, although not all ethnies seem to qualify for a nation. 
 But this way, essential differences between modern nations and 
historical or anthropological ethnic communities become obscured. As 
Smith himself pointed out, the European nations are basically the product of 
the modern bureaucratic state, which, in the process of nation-making, was 
assisted by an emerging market economy and the development of secular 
                                                 
40 Smith, op. cit., p. 16. 
41 Smith, op. cit., p. 21.  
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education and culture.42 In these passages, nations are essentially modern 
constructions:43 
 
“ … it is clear that nations are indeed modern phenomena in so far as: 
1. they require a unified legal code of common rights and duties, with citizenship rights 
where the nation is independent 
2. they are based on a unified economy with a single division of labour, and mobility of 
goods and persons throughout the national territory 
3. they need a fairly compact territory, preferably with ‘natural’ defensible frontiers, 
in a world of similar compact nations 
4. they require a single ‘political culture’ and public mass education and media system, 
to socialise future generations to be ‘citizens’ of the new nation. 
As we saw, it is rare to find most of these elements in any force in pre-modern ethnic 
states, however powerful they appear. 
     
 However, Smith is also of the opinion that there have been dominant 
“ethnic cores” at the starting point of the nation-building processes in 
Europe, and other ethnies were incorporated into these. Smith sees the 
ruling Norman feudal aristocracy in England after 1066 as such a dominant 
“lateral ethnie”. But he himself points out:44 
 
There was during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries considerable linguistic borrowing, 
intermarriage and elite mobility between conquering Normans and subordinate upper-
stratum Saxons, all within a framework of growing, if interrupted, state centralization 
and an English Catholic ecclesiastical organization. This meant that the bureaucratic 
incorporation of subordinate ethnic populations entailed considerable social intercourse 
and cultural fusion between Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Norman elements. 
 
 How much sense does it make to talk of a dominant “lateral ethnie” 
if there was considerable linguistic borrowing, intermarriage, elite mobility 
and cultural fusion between the Normans and various other ethnic groups 
soon after 1066? In the usual sense of the word, all features such as 
intermarriage happen mainly inside an ethnie and not across the borders of 
it.    
 So already as to Norman England his term of a dominant lateral 
ethnie is highly problematic.  It turns even more so when applied to e.g. 
France. He states that the French monarchy originated from the Isle de 
France, but he presents no empirical material that the aristocracy of this 
region was an ethnie with e.g. a distinct “myth of common ancestry”.  
Smith’s presentation obscures the point that the ruling strata in feudal 
society were connected by personal bonds of mutual rights and obligations 
with the king or emperor, and that these bonds could and were installed 
irrespective of and across ethnic allegiances.  
 But if we leave the scepticism regarding a “dominant lateral ethnie” 
aside, I completely agree with Smith’s summary of the process of nation 
building: 
 
                                                 
42 Ibid., pp. 59-61. 
43 Ibid., p. 69. 
44 Ibid., p. 55f. 
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It was through these three revolutions – administrative, economic and cultural – that 
outlying regions and their ethnies and middle and lower classes were incorporated … 
through the agency of the bureaucratic state. The creation of secular, mass nations was 
ultimately the outcome of a vigorous programme of political socialization through the 
public, mass education system.45         
 
 But exactly because modern nations are the product of bureaucratic 
states, market economy and education systems, they are something 
completely different than pre-modern ethnies. We see the somewhat 
paradoxical result that Smith himself underlines the importance of the 
bureaucratic state and other institutions for modern nations, but then he 
seems to fail to see that exactly these institutions made modern national 
identity (a group feeling, see Prologue) qualitatively different from ethnic 
identity. Therefore a few remarks are needed: When it comes to social 
cohesion, the provision of political legitimacy has always been important. 
In pre-modern ethnies, to use Max Weber’s terminology, political leaders 
derived their legitimacy from traditional religious beliefs or from their 
charismatic qualities. In modern nations, however, power is legitimate 
because it respects explicit legal rules. One of the essential aspects of 
modern state-building has been the development of rule by law, a system 
that binds the subjects and the rulers. Power has been accepted as 
legitimate when it respected these rules. In Weber’s words, legitimacy 
emanated from a “positive statute in whose legality one believes”46. 
Legitimacy became further enhanced when power and lawmaking are built 
upon democratic procedures. Democracy is basically understood here as a 
set of rules and principles (freedom of speech and organisation, elections 
etc.).  
 Because the modern state does not depend on religious legitimacy 
any more, it can tolerate divergent religious beliefs. Religious minorities 
were even protected by the modern state, and this in turn has strongly 
increased the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of these groups. Of course, 
religious groups have had to respect the legal system, and they have had to 
recur to legal mechanisms and rules, if they wanted to alter legislation. 
Religious fundamentalism, which places the holy scripts higher than the law 
and the democratic process, has not been compatible with modern 
democracy. Yet, if it is accepted that religion is basically a private matter 
and that the law must be respected, religious heterodoxy does not 
substantially endanger the social cohesion of a modern nation.  
 It has often been overlooked that the modern democratic nation state 
has been enormously successful at accommodating cultural differences. In 
the 19th century in countries such as France, Italy or Germany, one section 
of the population was pitted antagonistically against the Catholic church, 
but that has been history for a long time now. Bitter confrontations on the 
question of choice of language in, for instance, the Danish-German border 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 61. “into the dominant lateral ethnic culture” omitted. 
46 “ … kraft positiver Satzung, an deren Legalität geglaubt wird.” Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, Cologne, Berlin, 1964, p. 26. 
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region have passed into oblivion, and so have movements such as the 
Sicilian separatism. The strong cultural tensions in the wake of e.g. the 
Polish immigration to the Ruhr have completely abated, and so have the 
problems in connection with e.g. Italian immigration to France. Decades 
ago, most European countries were torn by murderous confrontations 
between ideologies such as Communism and Fascism, i.e. systematic bodies 
of thought which claimed priority for certain values and norms. Compared 
to that time, politics has become rather boring in all Western states. Seen in 
this light, the current debates on the difficulties of Multiculturalism seem to 
suffer from historical forgetfulness. True, immigration and globalisation 
have recently created new problems, which have to be addressed. But seen 
from a historical perspective, these problems are not so new, nor do they 
seem to be particularly grave.47      
 The capability of the modern democratic state to accommodate 
cultural differences depended, among other factors, on its ability to protect 
all citizens. Furthermore, the state had to be able to socialise the citizens in 
such a manner that they would be able to communicate among themselves, 
and that they would accept the state as a community.  Subsequently, 
majority decisions became acceptable, cultural differences not-
withstanding.  
 Several countries, particularly the African ones, have still a long way 
to go. Such states are rather unstable as they protect their citizens only 
insufficiently. In addition, the rules of law and democracy are not properly 
respected, and the education system is comparatively weak. As a 
consequence, a national identity is yet underdeveloped; instead ethnic 
identities often still prevail. Smith, however, having seemingly forgotten 
what he himself wrote about the importance of the state and other 
institutions for the creation of modern nations, presents an account of the 
African problems where again the essential difference between a national 
identity and an ethnic identity is utterly confused.48  
 This problem is also recognizable in another field. Smith adapted 
Hans Kohn’s49 distinction between a western civic model of a nation, and a 
non-western ethnic one. The components of the western model are “historic 
territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of its members, 
and common civic culture and ideology.”50 By contrast, a non-western 
‘ethnic’ conception of the nation places the emphasis on a community of 
birth and a native culture. In this model, a nation was foremost a 
                                                 
47 For a more detailed account as regards the German experiences, the reader might consult Zank, 
op. cit., passim. 
48 See for instance the following passage: “This lack of congruence between the state and the 
nation is exemplified in the many ‘plural’ states today. Indeed, Walker Connor’s estimate in the 
early 1970s showed that only about 10 per cent of states could claim to be true ‘nation-states’, in 
the sense that the state’s boundaries coincide with the nation’s and that the total population of the 
state share a single ethnic culture.” (Smith, op. cit, p. 15). Here the terms nation and ethnic 
community are completely confused, and the mythology that (some) modern nations have a single 
homogeneous ethnic culture resurfaces again.  
49 Smith, op. cit., p. 80; Kohn, Hans, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, Princeton, 1955. 
50 Smith, op. cit, p. 11. 
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“community of common descent”51 or a kind of “super family”. Smith adds 
the important observation that these are ideal types (in the sense of Max 
Weber), which cannot be found in their pure form in reality, and that in fact 
“every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees 
and different forms.”52 As an example he mentions France where the 
Jacobin nationalism was essentially civic, whereas during the 19th century 
in particular the clerical-monarchist Right was wedded to an ethnic 
‘organic’ concept of the French nation. Also Smith’s material about the 
development of an early English/British identity seems to reflect an ethnic 
model with mythologies of common descent.53  It is perhaps important to 
underline that nationalisms have always been heterogeneous movements. It 
is therefore completely erroneous to talk about “the” French nationalism, 
“the” German nationalism, etc. 
 We should also add to Smith’s presentation that the distinction 
between a “civic” and an “ethnic” concept of a nation is basically a 
distinction between a “modern” and an “immature” concept of the nation. 
At least when it comes to the legal system, today all modern western states 
adhere to the civic model. It is actually the only one which is compatible 
with the principles of the rule of law, democracy and equality. The civic 
model was initially developed in Western Europe because Western Europe 
was modern54 at an earlier state than Eastern Europe. We leave the question 
open to which extent ethnic nationalism still shapes the perceptions of the 
population at large. Parties such as the Front National in France might be 
evoked as examples of ethnic nationalism still having some political clout 
in Western Europe. However, parties who campaign on nationalist slogans 
of this kind constitute everywhere a minority. 
 In regards to the legal system, the EU has made acceptance of the 
civic model a condition for membership. The Copenhagen Criteria from 
1993 stated explicitly that accession countries had to guarantee “democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities”.55 In e.g. Estonia and Latvia there have been tendencies to shape 
legislation along ethnic-nationalist lines, for instance by barring citizenship 
to Russian-speaking inhabitants. But as the EU made clear, ethnic 
nationalist policies are incompatible with an EU membership. 
 As to the future of European integration, it hinges, according to 
Smith, on the “rise of a sense of specifically ‘European’ heritage and the 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., p. 13. 
53 Ibid., p. 58. 
54“Modernity” is here seen as the successful development of the institutions of a secular state, rule 
by law, democracy, and economic productivity. It is implied that in principle all countries will 
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55 See the website of the EU commission, 
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growth of an accepted ‘European mythology’”.56 In opposition I contend 
that if there was one sure way of discrediting the EU, then it would be 
through the creation of new mythologies. The EU is a set of modern 
institutions, and their stability will depend on their democratic legitimacy 
(essentially, see above, a question of rules), their transparency, and their 
efficiency. Nationalist movements needed mythologies but this is not the 
case with modern European states and their Union. 
 All in all, Anthony D. Smith has written an interesting book with 
many insights. But by insufficiently distinguishing between pre-modern 
ethnies and modern nations, and by crucially overestimating the cultural 
homogeneity and mythological necessities of modern nations, he has 
become a reproducer of nationalist mythologies. 
 
3. Liah Greenfeld: Nationalist mythology in our time 
 
 Liah Greenfeld’s book Nationalism - Five Roads to Modernity57, 
published in 1992, has won much acclaim. The Economist wrote: “This 
book is a great contribution to understanding nationalism’s place in the 
world”. According to John Gray in The New York Times Book Review, it is 
“a comprehensive, erudite and highly illuminating book”. The eminent 
scholar Walter Laqueur wrote in the Washington Post Book World: “For 
having tackled an enterprise of such magnitude and complexity, the author 
deserves our admiration.”58 
 Greenfeld’s aim was to trace the emergence of national identity, or 
nationalism (she uses the term interchangeably) in five cases (England, 
France, Russia, Germany, and the US). She starts by giving examples of 
semantic changes of the word “nation”. In her view, a crucial step was 
reached in sixteenth-century England when “nation” was not applied only to 
the elite any more, but to the whole population of the country. As a 
consequence, “people” became a positive entity. On this basis she seeks to 
give a definition of national identity: “National identity in its distinctive 
modern sense is, therefore, an identity which derives from membership in a 
‘people’, the fundamental characteristic is that it is defined as a ‘nation’.”59 
Thus, “identity” is closely linked to “nation”, but this is not yet a definition 
of “identity”. In fact, she never properly defines her key concept.  She 
writes, however, that identity is the “view the concerned actor has of 
himself or herself (…) Identity is perception”.60 Afterwards, however,  
“identity” is implicitly used to have a wider interpretation, covering also the 
norms and values of human behaviour. In fact, in her treatment, “identity” 
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is equivalent to “culture” in a very broad sense, covering group feeling, 
perceptions, and norms and values. And this culture is national.  
 “Nation” is a general category, but she insists on the specific 
character of each nation. She seems to imply that every nation has shared 
very particular cultural characteristics which are specific to it. In her own 
words:61  
 
 Social integration and cooperation are necessary for the preservation of the human 
species (as well as of its individual members), but there is no innate knowledge of how 
this should be accomplished. The lack of innate knowledge results in the need for models 
and blueprints, for an image of order, or created symbolic order, among human beings. 
Such symbolic order – culture – is the human equivalent of animal instincts, and is an 
indispensable condition for the survival of the human species as well as of individuals. 
The particular image of a social order provided by a culture forms the constitutive 
element of any given society. Within the limits set by the physical and psychological 
parameters of human nature, symbolic orders are widely variable, which explains the 
variability of human societies. 
  
 In this passage she does not use the word “nation” but “social order”. 
But from the context we have to infer that “nations” are particular types of 
“social orders”. So, every nation has its particular culture, and this culture is 
homogeneous – the old myth in new words.  
Concerning nationalism/national identity, she turns specific:62 
 
 Nationalism, among other things, connotes a species of identity, in the psychological 
sense of the term, denoting self-definition.  In this sense, any identity is a sense of ideas, a 
symbolic construct. It is a particularly powerful construct, for it defines a person’s 
position in his or her social world. It carries within itself expectations from the person 
and from different classes of others in the person’s surroundings, and thus orients his or 
her actions. 
 
 This states explicitly that nationalism implies a particular culture, 
which steers (“orients”) the activities of the individuals. Thus, “nation” and 
(one homogeneous) national culture are closely connected. This is again the 
old and simple nationalist mythology.  
 Greenfeld uses “national identity” (i.e. “national culture”) and 
nationalism interchangeably. Usually the term “nationalism” denotes a 
political movement. As such, it only comprises a part of the population. 
Other parts of society have adhered to different ideologies settings, e.g. 
Catholicism or Socialist Internationalism. Greenfeld, however, without any 
discussion, equates political nationalism with “national identities” and 
makes deductions from ideological figures of political nationalism to the 
ideological matrix of the whole nation.    
 At the end of the introduction, however, she revokes her position:63 
   
Do the origins of nationalism which define its nature … also completely shape its social 
and political expressions? Is the conduct of a nation – its historical record – determined 
by its dominant traditions? The answer to these questions is no. The dominant traditions 
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create a predisposition for a certain type of action, and a probability that, in certain 
conditions, such action will take place. 
 
 Thus, national identity does not steer action, as it did in the quote 
before, it only creates dispositions. It should also be noted that in the above 
quote whole nations are collective actors, as if they were one person (“the 
conduct of a nation”).  
 After having stated the uniqueness and “necessary” homogeneity of 
a national identity, Liah Greenfeld makes a surprising admission: “I was 
bewildered by the complexity of the historical evidence”64. She is also 
“aware” of “’multiple continuities’ in every one of the nationalisms” she 
studied.65 She mentions e.g. “science”, which was first institutionalised in 
England but developed elsewhere too. Romanticism has its origins in 
Germany but was also to be found in other countries, along with liberalism 
and anti-Semitism. In other words, she is aware of the existence of various 
and conflicting cultural trends which where transgressing national borders, 
and which were found inside many national settings where they created a 
cultural heterogeneity. Nevertheless, she insists on a clear distinction 
between national identities. The operation is simple: “I treated such 
‘international’ traditions as singular features of particular nationalisms …” 
In other words, she attributes international trends to one particular nation. 
England receives credit for science and liberalism, and Germany 
romanticism and anti-Semitism. She justifies this procedure as follows: 
  
The same tradition, metaphorically, might be a dominant gene in one case, and a 
recessive one in another. I am aware of ‘multiple continuities’ in every one of the 
nationalisms I studied. In each there were defeated traditions and roads not taken. I did 
not focus on them because they were not taken.66  
 
 We will return to this last point soon, we just note here that she 
introduces a political criterion (“defeated traditions”) when it comes to the 
selection and assigning of cultural currents to a nation.  This way, she feels 
legitimated in not trying to find out how widespread cultural currents 
actually were. In this connection, we may also note that a biological 
analogy (“dominant gene”) is used as a substitute for an academic 
argument. 
 She assigns widespread transnational currents to one nation only and 
thereby evicts them out of the national settings of all the others. A similar 
methodology of discarding is applied to regional cultural settings: “I have 
focused on those regions or sections within each population whose 
traditions have left a particularly deep imprint on that population’s national 
identity. This is the reason for the emphasis on the development in 
Protestant as against Catholic Germany (and specifically on Prussia as 
against Austria) …”67 But in Germany after 1871, the Catholic parts of the 
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population numbered about 35 percent of the population. Furthermore, she 
locates the emergence of German “national identity” to the first half of the 
19th century. At that time the Austrians and the Catholic German-speaking 
population in northern Bohemia considered themselves as Germans too. If 
both groups are included, the number of Catholic Germans rises to above 50 
per cent. Thus, in the case of Germany, Greenfeld expels more than half of 
the population from her “analysis” before she even starts it. As we shall see, 
by evicting science and liberalism too, there is not much left. Greenfeld 
concentrates “upon the formation of national identity, not its promulgation”, 
and: “The character of every national identity was defined during the early 
phase, which is here discussed in detail.”68 In other words, she introduces 
the idea that a national identity was created at a certain point in time – and 
thereafter remained constant. Thus, the familiar nationalist myth of the 
cultural constancy of national culture became a steering axiom of her book. 
 In her view, intellectuals played a key role in the formation of 
national identities, and it was their work she wanted to reconstruct. “I based 
my interpretation on the testimonies of the participants, left by them in laws 
and official proclamations, as well as in the works of literature or 
scholarship which they produced, their diaries and private correspondence. I 
tried to rely chiefly on primary sources, using secondary historical analysis 
for orientation when my own knowledge of them was insufficient.”69 In 
other words, only casually did she study the academic research, which 
existed on the field she wrote about. 
 Furthermore, in Germany alone, between 1801 and 1830 about 
122,000 books were published.70 Thus, for an author who claims to base her 
construction “chiefly on primary sources”, there are plenty of possibilities 
to choose (and to discard) among. 
 The following will provide a closer look at her empirical findings. 
Focus is set on Germany. In Greenfeld’s view, German “national identity” 
was formed between 1806 and 1815, and its two building blocks were 
“ressentiment against the West” and racism, in particular racial anti-
Semitism. 71 “… German national consciousness was unmistakably and 
distinctly racist from the moment it existed, and the national identity of the 
Germans was essentially an identity of race, and only superficially that of 
language or anything else. The language, deeply revered as it was, was but 
an epiphenomenon, a reflection of race, ‘the indisputable testimony of 
common descent’. (…) In the minds of the architects of the German 
national consciousness, one could not exist without the other, and both 
represented the fundamental bonds of German nationality.”72 
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 She quotes in this context Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, Theodor Körner 
and other exponents of militant nationalism in the time of the anti-
Napoleonic wars, who indeed expressed a very aggressive form of 
nationalism. But why were these men representatives or even “architects” 
of “German national consciousness”, and not e.g. Johann Wolfgang v. 
Goethe or Friedrich Schiller, who thought in completely different terms? 
Why not e.g. Immanuel Kant, a philosopher who has had a profound impact 
on German (and European) intellectual life, and has worked e.g. on the 
problem of how to achieve lasting peace? Or why not Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing, the most important author of the second half of the 18th century 
and influential spokesman for the emancipation of the Jews, often read and 
played from his days until today? In her view, Kant and Lessing do not 
count because, allegedly, German “national consciousness” was formed in 
the beginning of the 19th century. Thus, all the “enlightenment authors”, 
Kant and Lessing among them, can be discarded. But why, then, are Goethe 
and Schiller not in her sample, given the point that they were highly 
productive exactly in the years, which Greenfeld labelled “formative”? We 
presume: Because they do not fit into the pattern. At any rate, Greenfeld did 
certainly not choose the authors who had the widest circulation or the 
greatest impact on later generations. The problem of representativity does 
not enter her considerations. 
 In her introduction Greenfeld writes that she has based her 
interpretation, among other things, on the “testimonies of the participants, 
left by them in laws and official proclamations”73. But she does not quote 
any law or official proclamation from that time period at all. A good 
starting point could have been the Hambacher Fest of 27 May 1832 with 
about 20-30.000 participants, the first manifestation of German nationalism 
as a mass movement.74 The slogans of the meeting were a united and free 
Germany, the abolishment of the privileges of the nobility, and Republic 
and Democracy. It should perhaps be underlined: German nationalism in 
the first half of the 19th century was a democratic movement. 
 If “laws and proclamations” are relevant, then perhaps the National 
Assembly of 1848 is worth studying. This was the first freely-elected body 
in German history. After the fierce barricade fights of spring 1848 in 
practically every major German city, the traditional authorities accepted the 
election of a national representation, which should draft a constitution. The 
franchise varied slightly in the states of the German League; on average 
between 80 and 90 percent of the male population above the age of 25 years 
could vote.75 The constitution which the National Assembly finally 
endorsed in 1849, combined democratic, monarchic, federal and unitarian 
principles:76 A Kaiser should be head of state, but all legislation was to be 
elaborated by a two-chamber parliament which consisted of a Volkshaus, to 
                                                 
73 See note 69. 
74 Wehler, op.cit., p. 365. 
75 Wehler, op. cit., p. 738. 
76 Ibid., p. 750. 
 
 
 
27 
be elected by the universal franchise of all male citizens, and a Staatenhaus, 
which represented parliaments and governments of the member states. The 
monarch had a veto right, but this veto could only delay and not block 
legislation.  In our context perhaps particularly important: Equality in front 
of the law, Jews included, belonged to the basic principles of the 
constitution (§ 137: “… The Germans are equal in front of the law …”)77. 
In fact, in 1849 most of the discriminations against Jews were already 
abolished (in e.g. Prussia in 1812), but the constitution made it an 
compulsory principle also for the most back warded parts of Germany. This 
constitution reflected German nationalism at this time.  
 Greenfeld might feel justified to discard the National Assembly 
1848/49 because its project of German unification failed. In 1849 the 
traditional monarchic authorities remained victorious, and Bismarck’s 
united Germany of 1867/1871 was much less democratic. But such 
reasoning raises the question regarding what is more relevant for the study 
of “national cultures”: The result of elections and the expressions of the 
political will of the vast majority of the population, or the question of who 
controls the bigger guns? In 1849 the traditional powers, which were in 
control of the bigger guns, won the civil war. But wasn’t Greenfeld’s book 
about culture? 
 Furthermore, the construction of the German Reich of 1867/187178 
shows that it would be erroneous to regard the movement of 1848/49 as a 
plain failure.  Bismarck was no democrat, but he had to make compromises 
with the most influential currents in the German population. Therefore, also 
the constitution of 1867/71 contained a two-chamber parliament, where the 
Reichstag was elected on the basis of a universal and equal franchise 
(something England did not have at this time). The constitution of 1867/71 
was not democratic in the sense that the government was not dependent on 
parliament; the chancellor was appointed by the monarch, and executive 
institutions (most crucially: the armed forces) were not subject to 
parliamentary control. But the Reichstag had to endorse all legislation and 
the federal budget. As was the case with the constitution of 1849, freedom 
of speech, of press, and of organisation were basic constitutional principles, 
and so was equality in front of the laws. The Jews were, of course, 
judicially completely emancipated. And throughout the 19th century they 
experienced a steady social advance.  
 The National Liberals, political heirs of the 1848/49 movement, were 
the strongest political party after 1867, and Bismarck’s main political ally in 
Reichstag in the 1870s. Eduard Lasker was chairman, and Ludwig 
Bamberger, the “father of the Reichsmark”, was particularly influential 
within economic policy making. Both were Jews. And at the elections to the 
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first Reichstag in 1871, National Liberals, left-wing liberals, and the 
Catholic Zentrum party gained in total 63 per cent of the votes.79 This 
means that political forces, which, according to Greenfeld, did not represent 
German “national identity”, received two thirds of the votes.   
 “Resentment to the West”, we remember, was another building block 
of Greenfeld’s “German identity”. She quotes several authors who indeed 
had negative attitudes as regards France or England. But she seems to 
regard France and England as interchangeable nations in this context, and 
thus she perceives the hatred against the Napoleonic occupation 1806-13 as 
an expression of resentment to the “West”. Yet, at that time many leading 
politicians were positively impressed by English institutions. As Greenfeld 
states: “Both Stein and Arndt, for example, admired England.”80 Stein was 
Prussian prime minister and one of the main initiators of the liberal reform 
wave after 1807.  But again, neither the politician Stein nor the intellectual 
Arndt are valid exponents of the “German national identity”.  By contrast, 
the anglophobe Heinrich v. Treitschke could represent “the” “German 
opinion of the English nation”.  
 In Greenfeld’s account, Adam Smith is a negative figure to “the” 
German mind. But Christian Kraus, Kant’s successor at the philosophy 
chair in Königsberg, claimed that Smith’s Wealth of Nations was the book 
that  “produced the most benevolent results since the New Testament.”81 
Furthermore, Adam Smith (and other liberal economists) had a tremendous 
influence in Germany, not the least within the Prussian bureaucracy. The 
economic policy of Prussia, and of the Zollverein, the customs union after 
1834, was one of systematic liberalism. In many cases, Prussia practised 
liberal principles more consistently than Great Britain, a fact that did not 
pass unnoticed by contemporary British liberals. John Stuart Mill, for 
instance, when arguing for a land reform in Ireland, evoked the Prussian 
agrarian reforms as an example and wrote that the “ministers Stein and 
Hardenberg (…) revolutionised the state of landed property in the Prussian 
monarchy, and left their names to posterity as the greatest benefactors of 
their country.”82 
 The economic historian William Oscar Henderson, when placing the 
Prussian policy in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars in a comparative 
perspective, wrote: “Prussia’s moderate duties stood in sharp contrast to the 
high tariffs and prohibitions of her neighbours [Footnote: Professor J.H. 
Clapham considered that Prussia had ‘immeasurably the wisest and most 
scientific tariff then existing among the great powers’, The Economic 
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Development of France and Germany 1815-1914 (1936), p. 97] Huskisson 
praised the Prussian tariff in a speech in the House of Commons in 1827 
and commented: ‘I trust that the time will come when we can say as much 
for the tariff of this country.’”83 Thus, once again we have to note that 
Greenfeld’s account is utterly at odds with Germany’s most influential 
intellectual currents and political practices.  
 We can, of course, agree with her that anti-Semitism existed (as an 
inferior current which had no influence on constitutions or legislation). But 
it did not exist in the manner depicted by Greenfeld. According to her, 
“German national consciousness was unmistakably and distinctly racist 
from the moment it existed, and the national identity of the Germans was 
essentially an identity of race, and only superficially that of language or 
anything else.”84 We notice again that “the” Germans have just one 
“national identity” or “national consciousness”. As empirical evidence, she 
quotes Arndt, Körner, Jahn and Schlegel, i.e. four quotes all in all, who 
depicted the Germans as being united by a “bond of blood”, being “pure 
blood”, and the like. However, in a footnote she writes that in Fichte’s view 
the Germans, i.e. the German-speaking people, were a “mixture”.85 She 
does not inform us why Fichte in this case did not represent “the” German 
national consciousness. Yet interestingly, in this context she accepts Arndt, 
i.e. the same Arndt whose Anglophilia she otherwise dismissed as irrelevant 
for “the” German identity. Thus, Greenfeld does not merely select among 
authors, according to whether they fit into her pattern or not. Also the same 
author becomes switched on or off, according to the pattern.  
 There were, as a matter of fact, dozens and hundreds of authors who 
saw language, without any reference to or even in clear opposition to 
“blood”, as the constituent of German identity. It may suffice to point at the 
statistician Richard Böckh, who in his influential publications in the 1860s 
argued that language was the only adequate indicator of nationality and 
therefore concluded that the Ashkenazi Jews had to be classified as 
Germans, given the point that Yiddish was unquestionably a German 
dialect, derived from medieval German.86 
 We can agree with Greenfeld that for authors such as Jahn, language 
and “blood” goes hand in hand. However, postulating a “bond of blood” is 
not the same as racism. The bond of blood is a metaphor which was used 
everywhere by ethnic nationalists; for them a nation was a community of 
descent, comparable to a big family. Ethnic nationalism is also to be found 
in England or France, and Spanish nationalists have explicitly referred to 
the purity of blood as a Spanish characteristic (“liempieza de sangre”).87 It 
is relevant in this context to revert to Anthony Smith and Hans Kohn, who 
juxtaposed this “ethnic” nationalism to “civic” nationalism”. Greenfeld 
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herself presents this distinction in her introduction, declaring it to be a 
“useful analytical tool”.88 But then she abandons it and declares ethnic 
nationalism to be identical with biological racism. But entertaining a myth 
that your own nation is a kind of big family and a community of descent 
does not imply that you watch your neighbouring nation as a different race. 
It can be just another “family”. Certainly, the idea of “bondage of the 
blood” is not properly compatible to the idea of the emancipation of the 
Jews. But it is not the same as biological racism. Besides, as it has been 
noted earlier, German constitutions and legislation were not exclusive in 
this sense, the Jews (as well as the Poles, the Danes, the Mazurians, the 
Sorbians, the Kashubians, etc.) received exactly the same legal status as the 
Westphalians or the Bavarians. 
 According to Greenfeld, racial anti-Semitism is “from the outset” a 
part of the German racial national identity.89 The empirical basis for this 
claim is constituted by two quotes, Herder and “a patriotic lawyer, 
Grattenauer”. Herder wrote that the Jews were “in Europe an Asiatic folk 
foreign to our continent”, and, according to Grattenauer, they were an 
“Asiatic, alien folk.”90 Both quotes can be regarded as being judaeophobic. 
But an alien folk is not another race.  Thus, when it comes to racial anti-
Semitism, Greenfeld has not one single contemporary source from the time 
which, according to her, was formative to “national identity”. This may not 
be surprising given the point that biological racism is a phenomenon of the 
second half of the 19th century, in the wake of Darwinism. It originated in 
England and France (Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Arthur de Gobineau) 
and came to Germany as a foreign import. Racism, in this respect 
considerably deviating from ethnic nationalism, depicted the Jews (and e.g. 
the yellow race) not only as different people, but also as different biological 
creatures, endowed by nature with different genes and therefore immutable.  
By 1900 this way of thinking was rather widespread, not the least in the US 
or in Great Britain. For instance, the future president Theodore Roosevelt, 
when being agitated by Chinese immigration to California, talked of the 
Chinese as the “immoral, degraded, and worthless race”. And in a similar 
context Rudyard Kipling remarked: ”There are three races who can work 
but there is only one that can swarm.”91     
 Greenfeld further writes that “the” Germans saw the Jews as an 
“Asiatic” folk. But on the same page92 she also constructs a “German 
identity” according to which the Jews were identified with the West. Should 
it thus be concluded that the “West” was located in Asia?  
 It is rare to find a presentation as Greenfeld’s, composed to such an 
extent of self-contradictions, mangled evidence and one-eyed selectivity. 
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What is actually her “methodology”? Greenfeld’s axiomatic starting point is 
the idea that the Holocaust is the authentic expression of German identity. 
This becomes apparent already in the heading of the chapter (“The Final 
Solution of Infinite Longing”). The second axiom is the postulate that 
German “identity” was formed around 1815 (allowing her to dismiss Kant, 
Lessing, and many others). According to axiom number three, “national 
identity” remains unchanged once it was established. As a “result” she 
states: “Germany was ready for the Holocaust from the moment German 
national identity existed. It is imperative to realize this.”93 Consequently, 
her treatment of the empirical material follows a simple pattern: Only 
pieces which fit into the pattern are accepted, all the rest becomes 
discarded. And when no proper evidence can be produced (as is the case 
with e.g. racism), it becomes mangled in order to make it fit. 
  By a similar procedure, she constructs an English, French, Russian 
and American “national identity”. The “results” were, of course, very 
different. Russia, was painted rather darkly in a similar manner as Germany, 
but England and in particular the US appeared shining brightly. Her 
summary of the “identity” of her own country is quoted below: 
 
The uniqueness of the American nation consists in that in the course of its long existence 
(…) it has remained faithful to the original idea of the nation, and come closest to the 
realization of the principles of individualistic, civic nationalism. It stands as an example 
of its original promise – democracy – a proof of its resilience and viability despite the 
contradictions inherent in it. It is because of this, not because of its newness or 
heterogeneity, that America is not a nation like all the others.94 
 
        I see this as a naive exercise in national self-glorification. Was 
this the reason for the enthusiastic reception, which Greenfeld’s book 
received among American reviewers?95 At least Michael Ignatieff, in the 
New Republic, seems to be fascinated by the book exactly because of its 
ideological implications: “An exhilarating, ambitious, and thoughtful study 
(…) Greenfeld’s analysis allows one to see just what is wrong with that 
strain of liberal thinking that views nationalism as a form of atavism.”96 
 But Ignatieff does not seem to be aware of the point that, by applying 
Greenfeld’s methods, one could easily construct an “American Identity” 
along the following lines, perhaps under the heading: Wounded Knee, 
Hiroshima, My Lai – The American Nightmare Comes True. As a motto one 
could choose General Phillip Sheridan’s remark that only a dead Indian was 
a good Indian. We proceed by juxtaposing solemn texts such as the 
Declaration of Independence, according to which all men are created equal 
and endowed by their Creator with certain undeniable rights, with other 
                                                 
93 Ibid., p. 384. 
94 Ibid., p. 484. 
95 To be true, not all reviewers were equally enthusiastic. Fritz Stern wrote: “The exposition is 
clear, even when the sociology is a bit abstract and the history erroneous. The German section is 
particularly weak. The author’s reach is far greater than her grasp.” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, 
p. 203. 
96 http://www.hup.harvard.edu/reviews/GRENAO_R.html. 
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American texts, which justify slavery and the invasion of Indian territory. In 
this context, it is also possible to include some racist remarks by Theodore 
Roosevelt.97 We collect evidence about the treatment of black slaves and 
Indians, and about the relentless and merciless expansion westwards. We 
conclude that hypocrisy and an uncontrollable urge to suppress or to 
exterminate non-White people have been the building blocks of American 
Identity. The atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the widespread use 
of Napalm in Vietnam and, more recently, the torture of Iraqi prisoners are 
but emanations of this spirit.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 We have studied three important books, which in many respects are 
very different. But they have in common that substantial elements of 
national mythology, in an uncontrolled way, have entered the very 
foundations of their argumentations. At least partially, all three books have 
thus become carriers of a nationalist mythology themselves, whether this 
was the intention of the authors or not. 
 The gateways for the inflow of nationalist myths have been different 
in character. Gellner, who has criticised some nationalist myths himself, 
postulates that an industrial society requires a uniform national culture. If 
this were true, it would actually be a vindication of the old nationalist myth 
of the homogeneous nation. But Gellner uses a very blunt concept of culture 
and falls into a “structuralist fallacy”, namely by implicitly postulating that 
all aspects of culture are part of one strictly interconnected set. But this has, 
at least in regards to modern nations, blatantly not been the case. People 
may speak the same language and nevertheless adhere to completely 
different sets of beliefs or values, whereas people speaking the same 
language might have very similar outlooks or creeds.  
 In a way, Gellner’s “sin” is one of exaggeration: We agree that the 
transition to industrial society has been accompanied by some important 
cultural changes, among them new requirements for communication. But by 
jumping from this observation to the idea that an industrial society requires 
a uniform culture, he ends up formulating a position which is at odds with 
the empirical reality of an industrial society. Furthermore, in contrast to 
Gellner’s model, industry and  capitalism in general have constantly 
developed dynamic cooperation and interaction across cultural and national 
borders. This is one of the reasons why “globalisation” is currently 
perceived by many as being highly confusing, not to say menacing. Finally, 
Gellner’s model fails to explain aggressive and imperialist nationalism. 
Actually, according to Gellner’s logic, nationalism is about making culture 
and state congruent. Imperialism would be against its very nature – this 
                                                 
97 See, for instance, Finkelstein, Norman G., ’Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s ”Crazy” Thesis: A 
Critique of Hitler’s Willing Executioners’, new left review, 224, july/august 1997, pp. 39-87, esp. 
p. 81.  
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being another standard myth which nationalists have cultivated time and 
again, in striking contrast to the historical evidence in many, many cases. 
 In contrast to Gellner’s mainly abstract model reasoning, Anthony D. 
Smith unfolded a rich historical panorama. It suffers, however, from a 
substantial internal contradiction. On the one hand, he underlines that 
nations, in all their major aspects, are modern creations. In this context, he 
points at the bureaucratic state as the major agent of nation building, and the 
importance of the interconnected administrative, economic and cultural 
“revolutions”.  Yet, on the other hand, he operates with a concept of 
“national identity” which is closely linked to his “ethnic identity”. This 
way, he blurs the border between pre-modern ethnies and modern nations, 
thus making the nation appear as an “old” phenomenon. The components of 
his ”national identity” (for instance “common historical mythology”) 
presuppose a high level of cultural homogeneity which again is at odds with 
the reality of modern nations. It is striking that an author who otherwise 
informs the reader about numerous empirical details, completely refrains 
from empirical testing when it comes to his definition of “national identity”, 
which, after all, constitutes the very core of his book. Instead he concludes 
from the myths of nationalists about nations to the reality of nations. And he 
invokes functionalist arguments about the necessity of myths for social 
cohesion – functionalist arguments which might be useful for studying pre-
modern ethnies, but which are beside the point when dealing with modern 
nations. As a result, also Smith cultivates the nationalist myth of the cultural 
homogeneity of modern nation to quite some extent.   
    Neither Gellner nor Smith seem to have been nationalists in a 
political sense; up to a certain point they even both underline the 
mythological character of nationalism. Nevertheless, nationalist myths have 
crept into the foundations of their argumentation. 
 The case is different with Liah Greenfeld. Her book rests firmly on 
all the tenets of nationalist mythology (homogeneity, constancy over time, 
biological analogies), which become translated in a high-style Sociologuese 
(full of internal contradictions). The five main parts of the book contain five 
crude national stereotypes, whose empirical “substance” consists of a 
compilation of qualitative material which has been rigorously selected 
according to whether it fitted into the pattern or not. Questions of the 
quantitative distribution of cultural currents remain outside her interest – 
necessarily so, otherwise her idea of a “national identity” would crumble 
immediately. Her treatment of historical sources exhibits substantial 
mangling of her evidence – necessarily so, otherwise her axiom of the 
constancy over time of the “national identity” would crumble too. The flaws 
of her “methodology” are, in fact, inseparable from the content of her 
position. As explained in more detail in the Prologue, only by rigorously 
selecting qualitative evidence and disregarding quantitative problems can 
national stereotypes be dressed up to look “plausible”. Finally, in a time of 
cultural change, a constancy over time of a “national identity” can only be 
postulated by mishandling historical sources.  
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 According to Greenfeld’s “conclusions”, the “national identity” of 
her own nation, the United States, is very nice and compatible with 
universalism and the progress of humankind in general. By contrast, the 
Russian and particularly the German “identity” has been an ugly one, full of 
resentment and racial hatred. We see this as naive constructions by a 
nationalist author, who presents her own nation as shining brightly (auto-
stereotype), while particularly Russia and Germany serve as a dark 
background (hetero-stereotype). Therefore the heading for the section 
dealing with Greenfeld was chosen to be: “Nationalist mythology in our 
time.” 
 In spite of their differences, the works of Gellner, Smith and 
Greenfeld show that nationalist myths are still quite widespread in academia 
and they are still able to confuse authors. And perhaps somewhat ironically, 
particularly the comparatively new branch of “nationalism studies” seems 
to have been a channel for recycling nationalist myths.  
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